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Mark Twain once said that a classic is a book which
people praise and don't read. If this is true, then I do not
want this book to be a classic. I want it to be read and I
will use the rest of this book review to convince you to
do so.
But before I start, a premise should bemade: I assume
that if you are reading this book review, then you are a
philosopher, a sociologist, a legal scholar, an anthropol-
ogist, a culture studies scholar, a communications expert,
or anyonewith an interest in the future of technology, and
in particular artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and the
different forms that human-AI or robot interaction can
take. Among the possible readers of this book, I would
also include people who actually design and build intel-
ligentmachines, andso ifyouare inoneof thesegroupsor
consider yourself to be, then this book is for you.
It was written by people like you who in the summer
of 2014 met for a Robo-philosophy conference in the
windy city of Aarhus (Denmark) to discuss how we
could or should frame our relationships with a particular
kind of robots, namely, social robots—robots that are
built to closely interact with us, our children, our par-
ents, friends, patients, clients, and pets. This book is an
outcome of the conference.
Of course, this book is not and cannot be exhaustive in
treating the issue, and the editor cautionsus in that regard:
Here, I think, lies the difficulty of Marco Nørskov’s
task—the difficulty of selecting the works that would be
included in this volume. The 2014 Robo-philosophy
conference included more than one hundred paper pre-
sentations, and it goes without saying that selecting
twelve articles from such a large pool is a challenging
enterprise, one that Nørskov accomplished with success.
The book, as its title suggests, is organized into three
parts. The first part, Boundaries, explores the limits or
boundaries that for the time being differentiate human–
social robot interaction from human–human interaction.
Julia Knifa (BOn the significance of understanding in
human robot interaction^) argues that our human social
interaction is based on self-understanding, and this is not
yet possible in our interaction with social robots, since
these robots cannot be said to properly understand us,
nor can they be said to have a notion of themselves or of
their interaction with us. The same applies to the emo-
tions and to humanly recognizable interests, which ac-
cording to Raffaele Rodogno (BRobots and the limits of
morality^) are the condicio sine qua non for becoming
subject to moral consideration, a condition that robots
do not yet possess.
Refreshingly surprising in this section dedicated to
boundaries is JoshRedstone’s discussion of the complex
nature of the feeling of empathy (BMaking sense of
empathy with sociable robots^), where instead of reflec-
tions on the inability of robots to feel empathy, we find a
story about our failure to feel genuine empathy toward
machines. I find this a very interesting idea, fleshed out
by bringing in a number of elements, including the
uncanny valley phenomenon. So the boundaries
discussed in this part of the book are not only those that
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social robots have to overcome so as to become true
participants in social interaction, but also those that we
human beings have, and it is this dual perspective that
enables this book to bring fresh insights to the question
of the human–robot interaction.
The secondpart,Potential, is devoted to thepotential of
social robotics.Thispotential canbehinderedbyanalmost
instinctive reluctance of engineers to subject their research
to ethical review, and John P. Sullins (BEthical boards for
research in robotics and artificial intelligence: is it too soon
to act?^) makes the case that this reluctance will not help
the effort to improve the design and functionality of social
robots. Robotics and artificial intelligence have a serious
imageproblemin themedia,and this iswhyethicscouldbe
of use here in solving this problem. Due to the close
interaction between robots and human beings, firms can
no longer think only in the categories such as Bprofitable^,
Bcost effective^, andBsafeorunsafe^but shouldalso think
in terms of Bright and wrong^, and this is where ethical
boards come into play. The discussion here is particularly
useful because it provides some practical ideas on how an
ethical board could foster a dialogue with industry.
Also worthy of mention in this regard is Gunhild
Borggreen’s discussion ("Staging lies: performativity in
the human-robot theatre play I, Worker") of the robot-
human theatre play Hataraku Watashi (I, Worker). It pro-
vides us with another example of the potential of social
robots, namely that they can become works of art in their
own right, telling usmore about ourselves and thus helping
software engineers and other scientists to use this knowl-
edge so as to rethink and improve the existing design for
human–robot interaction. In this sense, the theatrebecomes
a robotics lab where the experiment of interacting with
robots is not only performed on stage but also brought to
the public.
The second part of the book, Potential, is linked to
the first part, Boundaries, by means of the attention
devoted to the uncanny valley phenomenon. But while
in Boundaries the uncanny valley serves to illustrate
how we fail to empathize with social robots, in Poten-
tial, it becomes a key to revealing to us something about
human nature, and in particular about the process of
dehumanization, which is what leads us to experience
the uncanny valley.
The third part of the book,Challenges, addresses four
challenges that social robots give rise to:
1. The challenge posed to the modern concept of social
actors (and of sociality itself). Social robots have a
deep impact on the institutional order of human soci-
ety, affectingourperceptionofwhat a legitimate social
actor is and how this sphere ought to be delimited.
Social robots challenge themodernconceptofperson-
hood—the notion that only human beings are per-
sons—thereby also calling into question the distinc-
tion between humans and machines, due to their ca-
pacity for interaction, autonomy, and learning.
2. The challenge posed to the social ontology through
which we assess who or what can be held morally
and legally responsible. This challenge can be con-
structed as a specification of the first one, but it also
adds a complicating condition, for the problem con-
c e r n s no t j u s t s o c i a l r o bo t s bu t a l s o
Bnonlocalizable^ ones, that is, robots made of mil-
lions of dynamic components that are continuously
replaced in the robot’s body.
3. The challenge of gender ascription and its implica-
tions in social robotics. The problem here is that the
way we interact with social robots (utilitarian or
affective ones) will to some extent depend on how
they look like, a factor that in subtle but significant
ways may influence our expectations, in just the
same way as it happens with humans, where we
sometimes expect different people to behave differ-
ently simply because of their looks. Here, anthropo-
morphism comes into play—our tendency to an-
thropomorphize a robot helps us interact with it.
The problem lies in the lack of objectivity both in
the way we design social robots and the way we
interact with them: Both their design and our inter-
action with them are shaped by our gender stereo-
types, and these stereotypes may be reinforced by
the interaction.
4. The challenge posed to our freedom of choice
and action when we become objects of control.
The problem here stems from the ability of
robots to frame our interaction with them, in a
situation where we either do what the smart
tool or robot asks us to do or we stop
interacting with it altogether. So what happens
is that smart tools may Bundermine one’s per-
sonal sovereignty,^ and they can be especially
successful in doing so if we are talking about
smart tools (including social robots) designed
for everyday life. This process of disempower-
ment has further implications as concerns our
personal responsibility and accountability: To
what extent can I still be held accountable for
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my actions if my freedom to choose and act is
constrained by my interaction with a robot?
The more we drill down into these issues, the
more we realize that the distinction between the
three parts into which the book is divided needs to
be taken with caution: The line between boundaries,
potential, and challenges is fuzzy and sometimes
even difficult to see. The discussion on the role of
understanding in human and robot interaction
(Knifka’s contribution in Boundaries), for example,
overlaps with the discussion of objectified interac-
tion frames (Hironori Matsuzaki’s contribution in
Challenges). The same can be said about the discus-
sion of ethical boards (Sullins’ contribution in Po-
tential) and Matsuzaki's chapter
If you have made it to here, you may conclude that
this book review is essentially a song of praise, and
hence that the book may become a classic that no one
will read. I do not think so. I think it will be read,
because it presents social robotics as a lens through
which to discover ourselves in a new light. In fact, as
the editor insightfully remarks, unlike any other tech-
nology invented so far, social robots enable us to truly
reflect on who we are. And this, I submit, is where the
value of this book ultimately lies; it gives us a fresh
perspective on social robots, prompting us to reflect on
what it means to be human.
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